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ABSTRACT  
This  paper  addresses  the  relationship  between  state  level  right-to-work  
(RTW)  legislation  and  employer  provided  health  insurance  coverage.  The  effects  
of  right-to-work  policy  are  debated  among  researchers  with  some  suggesting  it  
leads  to  a  positive  effect  on  wages  and  non-wage  benefits  and  others  suggesting  
the  opposite.  The  main  concern  and  goal  of  this  study  is  to  isolate the  effect  RTW  
laws  have  on  employer  provided  health  coverage.    This  study  incorporates  
demographic  and  firm  characteristics  that  prior  research  found  to  be  significant  
control  variables  for  isolating  the  effect  of  RTW  status  on  employee  health  
insurance  coverage.  Based  on  a  series  of  linear  probability  models  and  
difference-in-differences  models,  a  worker  residing  in  a  state  that  has  
implemented  a  RTW  policy  is  less  likely  to  obtain  health  insurance  than  their  non-
RTW  counterpart.  In  addition  to  RTW  status,  demographic  and  firm  
characteristics  affect  the  likelihood  of  an  employee  having  health  benefits.      
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CHAPTER  ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
  Right-to-work  legislation  is  best  explained  as  an  extension  of  a  federal  
court  ruling  stating  that  union  membership  cannot  be  required  of  workers  as  a  
contingency  of  employment.  State  legislators  decide  whether  to  implement  a  
right-to-work  policy  that  exempts  employees  from  paying  union  membership  dues  
but  requires  unions  to  represent  non-paying  workers.  Once  enacted,  unions  have  
less  available  funding  to  address  worker  grievances.  This  policy  has  resulted  in  a  
decline  in  union  membership.    
The  effect  of  right-to-work  legislation  on  worker  wages  and  benefits  is  
contested  among  researchers.  A  variety  of  control  variables  have  been  used  in  
prior  research  to  understand  the  impact  that  economic  factors  such  as  cost-of-
living  and  other  state-level  economic  conditions  have  on  employee  health  
insurance  in  RTW  states.  The  decision  to  obtain  health  insurance  has  been  
studied  as  it  relates  to  union  status  and  the  decline  in  union  presence  since  the  
1980s,  but  few  studies  have  focused  on  the  RTW  effect.    
Wage  decreases  negatively  impact  employee  ability  of  workers  to  pay  the  
employee  share  of  health  benefits.  Thus,  it  is  essential  to  determine  what  effect  
RTW  policy  has  on  employee  compensation.  The  following  research  focuses  on  
whether  RTW  status  is  related  to  health  insurance  coverage  after  controlling  for  
demographic  and  firm  characteristics.    
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CHAPTER  TWO  
LITERATURE  REVIEW  
The  decision  to  obtain  health  insurance  is  a  complex  choice  for  workers  
and  their  families.  It  is  difficult  to  know  the  reasons  why  one  chooses  to  acquire  
insurance  or  to  decline  it.  Such  decisions  can  come  down  to  individual  
differences  that  are  difficult  to  observe  and  vary  widely  by  personal  situation  and  
perceived  need.  Prior  research  has  attempted  to  estimate  the  factors  that  explain  
employee  choice.    
One  such  study  examined  the  role  of  employee  cost  and  firm  
characteristics  (Cooper  &  Vistenes,  2003).  That  is,  whether  employee  out-of-
pocket  expense,  and  employer  characteristics  effect  a  worker’s  decision  to  
accept  an  employer  offer  for  health  insurance.  Results  showed  that  the  larger  the  
required  employee  contribution,  the  less  likely  employees  were  to  purchase  an  
insurance  plan.  This  finding,  while  unsurprising,  suggests  that  the  level  of  
employee  contribution  factors  into  the  decision  to  obtain  coverage.  In  a  
simulation  study,  the  percentage  of  employees  covered  increased  when  
employee  contributions  decreased  to  zero.  However,  even  with  a  zero-employee  
contribution  rate,  the  coverage  rate  was  less  than  100%  (Cooper  &  Vistenes,  
2003).    uWorkers  are  more  price  sensitive  to  their  contribution  when  their  wages  
are  within  lower  and  middle  wage  rates  (Cooper  &  Vistenes,  2003).    
Research  has  consistently  shown  that  as  the  employee  share  increased  
fewer  individuals  choose  to  enroll  in  health  coverage  as  healthcare  costs  
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increase.  Chernew  (2005)  measured  the  association  between  rising  employee  
health  insurance  cost  and  the  tendency  for  insurance  coverage  rates  to  decrease  
in  several  metropolitan  areas  among  nonelderly  employees.  After  controlling  for  
economic  and  demographic  factors,  an  increase  in  insurance  premiums  
explained  more  than  one  half  of  the  decrease  in  coverage  rates  in  the  1990’s  
(Chernew  et.  al.,  2005).    
Health  care  coverage  is  an  option  most  would  elect  to  have  under  
favorable  conditions  such  as  low  premiums.  Some  common  reasons  workers  
forgo  insurance  may  reflect  a  difference  in  age  or  socioeconomic  status.  Over  
time,  non-wages  benefits  have  become  a  more  significant  percentage  of  total  
wage  compensation.  Fringe  or  non-wage  benefits  include  pensions,  vacations,  
holiday  pay,  and  life/accident/health  insurance.  This  change  in  the  significance  of  
non-wage  benefits  helps  to  explain  the  increasing  gap  between  wages  and  total  
compensation  as  salaries  have  decreased  over  time.    Prior  research  found  that  
low-skilled  workers  are  less  likely  to  maintain  coverage  than  high-skilled  workers  
in  periods  of  economic  downturn.  Lower  skilled  workers  are  forced  to  choose  
between  higher  take  home  pay  or  health  insurance,  and  generally  choose  the  
former.  (Chung,  2003).    
  Under  the  Taft-Hartley  amendment  of  1947,  states  were  given  the  right  to  
prevent  unions  from  requiring  workers  to  pay  union  dues  even  when  under  
contract.    Right-to-work  (henceforth  denoted  RTW)  legislation  offers  workers  the  
privilege  of  union  membership  benefits  without  having  to  pay  dues.  For  unions,  
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this  is  problematic  if  an  employer  gives  cause  for  a  worker  to  seek  redress;;  the  
union  must  represent  the  employee  regardless  if  the  individual  pays  union  dues.  
Since  workers  will  not  elect  to  pay  for  a  service  that  can  be  received  for  free,  
unions  are  left  with  less  funding  to  represent  workers  while  allowing  non-
members  to  benefit  from  union  negotiations.  This  plan  undermines  the  ability  of  
unions  to  leverage  better  benefits  and  wages  for  workers  (Gould  &  Kimball,  
2015).  
Differing  studies  have  expanded  how  RTW  status  effects  wages  and  the  
amount  of  fringe  benefits.  One  such  study  (Gould  &  Kimball,  2015)  found  wages  
in  RTW  states  are  lower,  on  average,  than  non-RTW  state  wages.  The  
researchers  discuss  the  difficulty  of  capturing  the  effect  of  RTW  status  in  their  
regression  equation  because  it  is  hard  to  isolate  the  effect  of  the  law.    Wages  
between  states  may  be  impacted  by  factors  such  as  employee  skill  level  and/or  
available  technology  and  need  to  be  accounted  for  to  avoid  biasing  the  impact  of  
RTW.    The  Gould  and  Kimball  study  used  a  cross-sectional  approach  and  
included  cost-of-living  indicators  and  other  state-level  factors  to  account  for  
differences  in  wages  among  states,  to  more  precisely  estimate  the  relationship  
between  RTW  status  and  wage  rates.        
The  Gould  and  Kimball  study  sample  consisted  of  304,157  workers  
selected  from  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistic  CPS  Outgoing  Rotation  Group  data  
set  for  years  2010-2012.  This  sample  included  individuals  living  in  RTW  states  
and  non-RTW  states,  with  38%  residing  in  RTW  states.    As  of  2012,  25  states  
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had  adopted  RTW  laws.    A  list  of  these  states  can  be  found  in  Appendix  G.    The  
ages  of  the  sampled  individuals  ranged  from  18  to  64  and  all  were  salaried  
employees.  Demographic  variables  were  included  to  control  for  individual  
differences  in  age,  race,  sex,  education,  and  marital  status.  Worker  
characteristics  were  (hourly,  full-time,  union/union  contract,  average  and  median  
hourly  wage)  and  state  characteristics  (unemployment  rate  and  three  cost-of-
living  variables).  These  variables  were  used  to  control  for  differences  between  
non-RTW  and  RTW  states.    
Gould  and  Kimball  incorporate  the  variables  described  above  in  addition  to  
a  RTW  indicator  variable  (1=if  RTW,  0=  otherwise)  in  four  regression  models.  
Their  dependent  variable  in  each  model  was  the  log  of  wages.  The  first  
regression  controls  for  fixed-effects  across  years.  The  second  adds  demographic  
variables  and  individual-level  labor  controls  (full-time  status,  hourly  status,  union  
status,  and  occupations  and  industries).  State-level  controls  and  two  cost-of-
living  measures  are  added  to  the  third  regression  model.  The  final  model  adds  a  
third  cost-of-living  index,  replacing  the  earlier  two  cost-of-living  indices  from  the  
third  model.  The  coefficient  for  the  RTW  indicator  variable  in  explaining  the  log  of  
wages  (the  dependent  variable)  was  consistently  negative  but  decreased  with  
each  respective  model,  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  wages  are  lower  in  RTW  
states.  The  final  model  estimated  the  average  annual  wages  to  be  $1,558  less  in  
RTW  states  than  non-RTW  states  for  full-time  workers.  In  addition,  they  found  
educational  and  racial  differences  between  RTW  and  non-RTW  states  (Gould  &  
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Kimball,  2015).  Non-RTW  states  have  a  better-educated  workforce,  a  larger  
percentage  of  white  workers.  and  greater  union  participation  in  RTW  states.  
(Gould  &  Kimball,  2015).    
  

Gould  and  Kimball  included  a  series  of  robustness  tests  to  determine  

which  worker  characteristics  and  demographic  variables  should  be  included  in  
their  regression  models.    These  alternative  model  specifications  did  not  change  
the  significance  or  sign  of  the  RTW  coefficients,  but  the  removal  of  union  status  
significantly  decreases  the  difference  between  state  types.  The  researchers  
argue  it  is  important  to  include  appropriate  control  variables  to  avoid  establishing  
a  biased  relationship  between  wages  and  RTW  status.  Removal  of  these  controls  
variables  confound  the  estimate  of  the  effect  of  RTW  legislation  (Gould  &  
Kimball,  2015).      
  

In  another  study  (Reed,  2003)  a  significant  negative  relationship  between  

RTW  states  and  the  wage  rate  was  also  estimated.  Similar  to  the  Gould  and  
Kimball  study,  these  researchers  also  controlled  for  differences  in  state-level  
economic  conditions  between  state  type  as  well  as  changes  in  economic  
conditions  before  and  after  RTW  laws  were  implemented  in  RTW  states.  Prior  
economic  conditions  in  each  state  were  controlled  because  it  was  hypothesized  
that  the  RTW  states  were  worse  off  than  non-RTW  before  the  adoption  of  the  
law.  States  that  changed  RTW  status  between  1944  and  2001  were  excluded  in  
the  study  (Reed,  2003).  The  excluded  states  are  Idaho,  Louisiana,  and  Wyoming.  
Oklahoma  was  retained  because  it  adopted  RTW  after  2001.    
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The  Reed  study  developed  three  regression  models  to  investigate  the  
relationship  between  wage  rate  and  RTW  states.  The  dependent  variable,  log  of  
wage  rate  is  regressed  against  RTW  status  (0=no,  1=yes)  for  model  1,  the  
successive  models  added  controls  for  demographic  differences  (model  2)  and  
economic  conditions  (model  3)  between  non-RTW  and  RTW  states  to  explain  
any  differences  due  to  state  status  for  the  log  of  wage  rate.    
Model  1  
When  using  average  state-level  the  log  of  wages  is  the  dependent  
variable  and  regressed  against  RTW  status,  without  including  past  conditions  
estimates  a  significant  negative  coefficient  and  associated  with  lower  wages.  
Model  2  
The  researcher  then  adds  demographic  variables  to  control  for  differences  
in  wages  at  the  state-level,  with  no  information  available  before  1958,  Per  Capita  
Personal  Income  (PCPI)  is  used  as  a  substitute  for  average  state-level  salaries.  
This  proxy  increases  the  coefficient  of  the  RTW  variable,  but  wages  are  still  low  
overall.      
Model  3  
  In  his  third  model,  separate  variables  for  agricultural  and  manufacturing  
share  of  gross  state  product  were  added  to  account  for  these  possible  state  level  
effects  with  RTW  laws  in  1945.  He  also  added  variables  for  the  U.S.  southern  
region,  education  level,  and  state  population  density  in  1945.    The  added  
variables  significantly  increased  the  value  of  the  RTW  coefficient.  The  large  
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change  in  the  RTW  dummy  variable  (specifically  with  the  inclusion  of  farm  and  
PCPI  variables)  suggests  that  past  economic  conditions  should  not  be  
overlooked  when  measuring  the  effect  on  RTW  status  has  on  wages  (Reed,  
2003).  
The  effect  of  union  status  helps  explain  the  wage  effect  for  individuals  in  a  
non-RTW  state  where  they  benefit  from  a  spillover  effect  .  This  effect  occurs  
when  non-unionized  employees  see  an  increase  in  their  wages  designated  by  
employers  to  prevent  them  from  joining  a  union.  Conversely,  in  RTW  states  with  
a  smaller  proportion  of  union  workers,  workers  may  also  benefit  if  employers  pay  
a  higher  wage  to  prevent  unionization.  Lower  wages  can  impact  the  affordability  
of  essential  non-wage  benefits  for  workers  such  as  health  insurance.      
A  study  on  the  effect  of  RTW  law  is  analogous  to  a  study  that  estimates  
union  membership  density  and  individual  wages  across  states.  The  decrease  in  
density  explains  a  quarter  of  the  decline  in  health  care  coverage  from  the  earlier  
1980s  to  late  1990s  (Buchmueller,  2002).  The  decline  in  union  density  may  be  a  
contributing  factor  to  the  disparity  in  the  income  and  wages  of  the  wealthiest  and  
poorest  as  well  as  the  divergence  in  worker  productivity  and  pay  for  middle-class  
workers  (Mishel,  2012).  Without  collective  bargaining  agreements,  workers  often  
lack  the  leverage  needed  to  secure  higher  wages  and  better  benefits.  This  
includes  not  just  members  of  unions,  but  those  who  benefit  from  the  spillover  
effect  attributed  to  a  union  presence  (Mishel,  2012).    
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A  study  measuring  the  effects  of  unionization  on  health  benefits  utilized  
information  on  firm  characteristics,  specifically  how  firm  size  effects  health  
coverage  for  firms  with  and  without  union  affiliation.  A  regression  model  explored  
the  hypothesis  that  unions  had  an  important  influence  on  health  benefits  and  
included  four  equations;;  the  log  of  the  mean  of  premiums  and  contributions  per  
employee,  percent  paid  by  employer  the  and  whether  a  firm  provides  health  
insurance.  A  union  status  dummy  variable  was  included  in  each  equation  as  
were  industry,  region,  size,  percentage  part-time  workers,  and  percentage  of  
employees  earning  at  or  close  to  minimum  wage  (Rossiter  &  Taylor,  1982).    
Results  suggested  that  employees  in  firms  with  a  union  presence  were  not  
more  likely  to  have  employer-sponsored  insurance  than  their  non-union  
counterpart.  However,  firm  size  has  a  significant  effect  and  larger  firms  are  much  
more  likely  than  smaller  businesses  to  offer  health  insurance.  The  higher  the  
percentage  of  workers  making  minimum  wage  the  less  likely  health  insurance  will  
be  offered.  Conversely,  among  specific  regions,  the  Northeast  and  North  Central  
the  probability  of  health  insurance  provision  was  larger  than  other  national  
regions.  The  union  variable  was  highly  significant  for  the  mean  premium,  
contributions,  and  percent  paid  by  employer,  suggesting  that  firms  with  a  union  
presence  have  higher  health  insurance  expenditures  than  those  without  unions.  
In  addition,  the  premium  per  employee  and  dollar  and  percentage  amount  paid  
out  by  employers  for  eligible  employees  is  higher  in  firms  with  unions  (Rossiter  &  
Taylor,  1982).  
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Freeman  and  Medoff’s  “What  Do  Unions  Do?”  is  widely  considered  to  be  
the  most  detailed  and  rigorous  assessment  of  the  union  effect  on  wages  and  
fringe  benefits.  Employed  to  predict  the  impact  of  unionization  are  two  facets  of  
unionism  described  as  the  monopoly  response  and  the  collective  response.  
Unions  achieve  monopoly  power  by  leveraging  increases  in  wages  and  benefits  
through  tactics  likely  to  be  costly  to  the  employer  such  as  threat  of  strike  which    
lead  to  wages  above  the  equilibrium  or  competitive  wage  rate.  Further,  increase  
in  salaries  and  benefits  make  workers  more  expensive  to  employ,  forcing  
unionized  firms  to  hire  less  and  substitute  new  technology.  The  collective  face  of  
unionism  allows  better  information  to  be  gathered  concerning  worker  preference  
to  ensure  union  behavior  is  responsive  to  employee  needs.  Union  decisions  often  
reflect  the  inclination  of  the  average  worker  instead  of  the  marginal  worker  who  is  
indifferent  between  staying  at  one  firm  or  leaving.  The  former  is  more  likely  to  
prefer  more  benefits  and  will  accept  lower  wages  to  get  them.  Unlike  the  
monopoly  effect  which  distorts  the  competitive  equilibrium  by  allowing  employee  
benefit  increases,  the  collective  voice  effect  does  not  affect  the  competitive  hiring  
levels  of  the  firms  as  this  aspect  represents  a  restricting  to  the  total  
compensation  package.    
Researchers  for  this  study  replicate  Freeman  and  Medoff’s  study  but  
added  a  component  to  the  union  effect.  The  facilitation  effect  increases  
awareness  of  the  availability  of  plans  rather  than  expanding  the  number  of  
workers  covered.  In  addition,  this  effect  highlights  the  likelihood  that  there  is  a  
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difference  between  union  and  non-union  workers  that  reflects  levels  of  
awareness  concerning  health  coverage  benefits  rather  than  an  availability  of  
coverage.  
There  were  two  measurements  of  interest  in  this  study,  the  difference  in  
coverage  between  union  and  non-union  workers  and  the  variation  in  coverage  
among  individuals  covered  under  union  contract  but  not  members  compared  to  
those  with  membership.  After  including  control  variables  for  demographic  and  
establishment  differences  between  workers  in  each  probit  model,  researchers  
found  that  in  both  areas  of  interest,  union  members  are  more  likely  to  have  health  
benefits  offered  by  the  employer.    For  individuals  covered  under  union  contract,  
but  not  dues  paying  members  the  difference  between  the  two  groups  is  linked  to  
a  facilitation  effect  where  individuals  who  are  union  members  are  more  likely  to  
receive  information  about  health  care  plans  and  have  access  to  union  
representatives  that  can  provide  them  with  additional  material  (Budd,  2004).    
One  study  highlights  a  departure  from  other  related  studies  by  stating  that  
most  RTW  research  has  focused  on  the  influence  unions  have  on  the  likelihood  
that  employers  provide  health  insurance  at  all  (Fichtenbaum  &  Olson,  2002).  Half  
to  two-thirds  of  the  union-non-union  wage  differential  is  said  to  be  explained  by  
the  differences  in  labor  market  characteristics  that  are  present  among  union  
workers.  These  components  include  bigger  firm  size,  higher  income,  and  more  
extended  work  hours  and  when  present  indicated  a  greater  probability  of  
employer  provided  health  insurance.    Another  avenue  of  consideration  is  whether  
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unionization  results  higher  expenditures  for  non-wage  benefits.  Evidence  
suggested  that  there  was  both  an  increase  in  likelihood  of  procuring  insurance  
and  a  greater  amount  of  spent  towards  it  by  firms  that  were  unionized.  
Researchers  of  the  Fichtenbaum  and  Olson  study  aimed  to  illustrate  the  
importance  of  including  fringe  or  non-wage  benefits  to  estimate  the  impact  of  
union  status  and  to  determine  whether  unionization  increases  expenditures  
levels  for  benefits.  The  sample  consists  of  private  sector,  full-time,  year-round  
workers.  The  dependent  variable  for  the  models  was  the  amount  the  employer  
contributed  to  health  insurance  expense.  A  Tobit  model  was  used  to  offset  the  
observations  where  the  amount  provided  by  the  employer  was  zero  which  would  
result  in  unbiased  results.  A  dummy  variable  was  created  for  union  status  for  
those  a  member  of  a  union  or  under  a  collective  bargaining  agreement.  
Education  variable  (at  eight  levels),  age,  location,  city  size,  firm  size,  marital  
status,  race,  occupation,  industry  and  year  were  included  as  controls  for  the  
model.    
Results  show  that,  on  average,  unionized  male  workers  receive  more  
annually  ($384)  from  employer-sponsored  insurance  than  do  non-unionized  men.  
Women  earn  less  per  year  ($296)  than  men,  but  still  more  than  women  who  are  
not  unionized  or  under  contract.  This  difference  was  due  to  women  having  a  
lower  probability  of  having  employer-sponsored  insurance.  The  union-non-union  
differential  was  nearly  the  same  among  men  and  women  who  work  full-time,  
year-long  and  have  health  benefits  (Fichtenbaum  &  Olson,  2002).    
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Next,  the  researcher  determined  whether  measuring  the  impact  of  
unionization  without  consideration  for  other  compensation  underestimates  the  
effect  of  unionization  on  the  total  compensation  package  difference  between  men  
and  women  who  were  unionized  or  covered  by  a  union  versus  those  who  are  not.  
To  investigate  that  research  question,  the  response  variable  is  a  total  amount  
that  includes  both  wages  and  contributions  made  by  employer  to  health  
insurance.  Evidence  showed  that  when  health  insurance  benefits  were  included  
in  compensation,  the  union-non-union  gap  increased  among  men  and  women,  
1.9  and  2.1  percent  respectively.    The  implication  was  that  union  employers  
spend  more  towards  health  insurance  benefits  for  their  employees  than  did  non-
union  ones  and  more  likely  to  provide  such  benefits  in  the  first  place  
(Fichtenbaum  &  Olson,  2002).      
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CHAPTER  THREE  
RESEARCH  DESIGN  AND  METHODS  
    Current  Population  Surveys  (CPS)  are  household  surveys  conducted  
every  month  in  conjunction  with  the  US  Census  Bureau  and  the  Bureau  of  Labor  
Statistics.  In  1996,  the  survey  questions  were  extended  to  gain  information  on  
health  insurance  coverage,  pensions,  union  status  and  as  well  as  demographics.  
Data  used  for  this  study  were  derived  from  the  March  Annual  Social  and  
Economic  Supplement  (ASEC)  survey  to  examine  if  health  insurance  coverage  
differed  between  RTW  and  non-RTW  states  over  the  2001-2013-time  period.  
Employer-sponsored  health  coverage,  hinsemp,  is  the  response  variable  used  to  
determine  the  probability  that  a  worker  is  covered  by  insurance  obtained  from  the  
employer.   The  dependent  variable  in  the  individual-level  or  original  data  set  is  
defined  as  1=having  health  insurance  coverage  and  0=not  having  health  
insurance  coverage.  The  empirical  data  set  consists  of  the  185,607  individuals  
from  approximately  two  million  individuals  in  the  full  data  set.  Observations  with  
missing  data  were  deleted  from  the  full  ASEC  data  set.    
Summary  statistics  for  the  collected  data  set  were  generated.    One  
interesting  summary  statistic  is  the  annual  difference  in  employee  health  
insurance  coverage  rates  between  RTW  and  non-RTW  states.  The  proportion  of  
coverage  in  RTW  versus  non-RTW  states  is  graphed  for  the  years  2001  to  2013  
in  Appendix  A.  This  aggregate  preliminary  analysis  for  the  proportion  workers  
covered  by  year  for  RTW  versus  non-RTW  states  status  revealed  a  consistent  
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difference  between  the  average  covered  proportions  over  time.  Non-RTW  states  
have  a  consistently  higher  proportion  of  insured  employees  than  RTW  states,  
and  this  difference  is  statistically  significant  in  each  year.  The  preliminary  
analysis  spurred  further  analysis  which  seeks  to  explain  the  difference  in  the  
proportion  of  coverage  between  in  RTW  and  non-RTW  states.    
To  further  evaluate  the  relationship  between  health  insurance  coverage  
and  RTW  status  individual-level  data  was  collected.  The  model  developed  
includes  terms  for  year  and  right-to-work  (RTW)  state  status.  An  indicator  
variable  (0=Non-RTW  and  1=RTW)  was  created  for  each  state.  States  that  at  
any  point  prior  to  2013  that  have  RTW  laws  are  defined  as  a  right-to-work  state,  
and  those  states  never  adopting  a  RTW  law  are  defined  as  non-RTW  states.    
Since  this  is  an  individual-level  data  set,  demographic  control  variables  
were  also  included  in  the  model.  Dummy  indicator  variables  were  created  for  all  
sociodemographic  variables  other  than  age,  which  was  treated  as  a  continuous  
variable.  The  sociodemographic  control  variables  were  coded  as  follows;;  race:  
White  (0),  Black  (1),  Asian  (2),  Other  (3).  Gender:  female  (1),  male  (0),  ages  (18-
65).  Education  includes  9  (0,1)  categories:  12th  grade  no  diploma  (baseline),  
high  school  diploma  (1),  some  college  (2),  Associate,  academic  (3),  Associate,  
vocational  (4),  Bachelors  (5),  Masters  (6),  Doctorate  (7),  and  professional  school  
(8).  Regional  dummy  variables  (0,1)  were  created  for  groups  of  states  and  were  
coded  as:  East  North  Central  division  is  the  baseline,  East  South  Central  (1),  
Middle  Atlantic  (2),  Mountain  (3),  New  England  (4),  Pacific  (5),  South  Atlantic  (6),  
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West  North  Central  (7)  and  West  South  Central  (8).  A  description  of  the  states  
located  within  regions  can  be  found  in  the  Appendices  section  (Appendix  I).  
Occupation  and  industry  are  categorical  variables  examined  to  investigate  
whether  coverage  differs  across  each  and  were  treated  as  firm  characteristics  to  
examine  if  employee  health  coverage  varies  by  industry.  Dummy  variables  were  
created  for  the  following  nine  aggregate  industries:  Manufacturing  and  
Construction,  Government,  Service  and  Retail,  Medical,  Financial,  Education,  
Agriculture,  Science  and  Technology,  Energy,  and  Other).    By  organizing  them  to  
into  clear  groups,  differences  in  coverage  could  be  examined  across  blue  and  
white  collar  employment.  Whether  coverage  is  offered  by  employers  depends  on  
the  status  of  the  worker,  firms  with  a  high  percentage  of  part-time  workers  will  be  
less  likely  to  provide  it  for  employees  due  to  higher  fixed  costs  associated  with  
such  employees  (Rossiter  &  Taylor,  1982).    Workers  who  are  employed  either  
part-time  or  full-time  are  described  by  the  variable  fullpart  (0  and  1,  respectively).  
A  dummy  variable  for  union  status  (0=no,  1=yes)  was  included  in  the  model  as  
reviewed  studies  have  shown  there  is  higher  probability  of  insurance  coverage  
associated  with  union  membership  and  those  covered  under  the  contract.  This  is  
in  addition  to  the  spillover  effect  associated  with  firms  that  have  a  union  
presence.  Firm  size  is  included  with  eight  (0,1)  categories:  under  10  (baseline),  
10  to  24(1),  10  to  49(2),  25  to  99(3),  50  to  99(4),  100  to  499(5),  500  to  999(6),  
and  1000  or  higher  (7).  There  is  an  overlap  for  some  of  the  firm  size  categories  
due  to  a  reorganization  that  occurred  in  the  year  2010  based  on  the  data.    
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Significant  health  care  legislation  change  was  enacted  during  that  year,  the  
Affordable  Care  Act  to  allowed  small  firms  employing  under  50  workers  to  forego  
the  offer  of  employer-sponsored  coverage.    
Two  modeling  approaches  were  used  to  estimate  the  effect  of  RTW  status  
on  health  coverage  to  deliver  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  laws  
effect.  A  linear  regression  model  was  used  to  predict  how  the  level  of  insurance  
coverage  would  change  across  demographics  and  differences  among  firms.  
A  difference-in-differences  model  was  implemented  to  isolate  the  RTW  effect  by  
accounting  for  preexisting  differences  in  the  average  health  insurance  coverage  
within  state.    
  First,  a  traditional  linear  regression  model  was  used  to  predict  health  
coverage  given  the  ease  of  interpretation.  The  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  
method  was  used  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  four  models  listed  below  to  
predict  whether  the  probability  of  health  insurance  changes  with  the  addition  of  
year,  demographic  and  firm  explanatory  variables,  controlling  for  RTW  status.    
Linear  Regression  on  Y:  

Y=b0+b1X1+...+bKXK+å  
å~iid  N(0,s2)  
Y={0,1}  
Four  models  were  developed  with  binary  variable  (0=no  insurance  
coverage,  1=insurance  coverage),  hinsemp,  as  dependent  variable  and  
regressed  on:  (1)  RTW  (2)  RTW  and  year  (3)  RTW,  year  (baseline=2013)  and  
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RTW/year  interactions  (4)  RTW,  year,  RTW/year  interactions,  race,  education,  
sex  and  race,  region,  fullpart,  union,  firm  size,  and  occupation  (5)  Less  RTW/year  
interaction  (Table  1.1).    
Next,  difference-in-differences  (DD)  models  are  used  to  eliminate  any  
unobserved  differences  between  states  that  may  influence  whether  a  state  
decides  to  implement  RTW  policy  from  states  that  do  not  and  so  controls  for  
background  trends.  The  DD  method  is  implemented  to  isolate  the  effect  of  the  
RTW  variable  by  accounting  for  pre-existing  differences  in  the  average  level  of  
health  insurance  coverage  between  states  (RTW  and  non-RTW)  to  show  how  
health  insurance  changes  when  RTW  status  changes.  When  subtracting  the  pre-
existing  means  the  estimated  effect  reflects  how  the  RTW  and  non-RTW  states  
change.  By  subtracting  these  pre-existing  differences,  we  ensure  that  the  effect  
of  RTW  status  is  not  correlated  with  differences  unobserved  between  states.  
The  dependent  variable,  employer-sponsored  insurance  (hinsemp),  is  
estimated  using  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  method  as  a  (0,1)  binary  
response  variable.  When  using  the  DD  model,  the  value  of  the  dependent  
variable  in  the  pre-period  accounts  for  any  term  included  in  the  error  term  in  
addition  to  terms  in  the  models  that  determine  health  insurance  coverage.  Two  
models  were  estimated  that  included  with  control  variables  to  examine  any  role  
the  controls  may  have  on  health  insurance  coverage.    Variable  X  was  created  to  
account  for  the  change  in  law  among  three  states  Oklahoma  (2001),  Indiana  
(2012),  and  Michigan  (2012)  for  the  year  after  their  law  was  enacted  and  those  
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subsequent  in  the  DD  models  for  period  2001-2013.  Variable  X  is  equal  to  1  for  
any  state  with  RTW  law  change  during  the  interval  studied  (2001-2013)  and  0  if  
otherwise.  This  change  was  only  accounted  for  in  one  direction,  from  non-RTW  
to  RTW  state  as  no  state  has  yet,  chosen  to  get  rid  of  their  RTW  law.  Data  was  
not  available  for  the  following  recent  RTW  states  and  so  were  considered  as  non-
RTW  states:  Wisconsin  (2015),  West  Virginia  (2016),  Missouri  (2017),  and  
Kentucky  (2017).    
Variable  X  interpretation:    E[Y|RTW=1  ,X=1]  -  E[Y|RTW=1,  X=0]  –    
(E[Y|RTW=0,  X=1]  –  E[Y|RTW=0,  X=0])  

This  contrast  is  set  for  each  state  that  changed  policy  to  become  a  RTW  state  
during  the  2001-2013  time  period  and  were  labeled  as  non-RTW  states  for  each  
year  prior  to  the  law  adoption.    
For  the  first  model,  hinsemp  was  regressed  on  variables  X,  statefip  
(Alabama=0,  Alaska=1,  etc.),  dummy  variables  for  each  year  (2001=baseline)  
and  demographic  controls  race,  education,  gender  and  age.  The  second  model  
estimated  included  the  same  model  above  plus  the  inclusion  of  industry  and  
occupation  categorical  variables.  Each  model  is  clustered  by  state  which  
removes  the  assumption  of  random  distribution  of  errors  between  each  
observation  and  instead  assumes  independence  of  errors  between  states.    
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CHAPTER  FOUR  
RESULTS  AND  DISCUSSION  
Linear  Probability  Models  
Five  linear  probability  models  were  estimated  to  investigate  the  
relationship  between  RTW  legislation  and  the  probability  an  employee  would  
have  employer  provided  health  insurance.  The  sample  size  for  linear  models  I-III  
include  all  observations  in  the  individual  dataset  (185,607).  With  the  addition  of  
the  industry  variable  to  linear  models  IV  and  V  some  observations  were  excluded  
when  industry  codes  were  organized  into  eight  categories  due  to  changes  to  the  
CPS  data  on  how  the  industry  variable  was  coded  across  different  time  intervals  
(years)  and  the  complexity  in  incorporating  each  different  set  of  industry  coding  
(147,495).  Moreover,  combining  each  coding  set  would  result  in  different  
designations  for  the  same  industry.        
Model  I  
The  first  model  regresses  the  dependent  variable  (coverage)  on  the  
indicator  variable  RTW  and  estimates  the  average  difference  in  having  health  
insurance  in  RTW  versus  non-RTW  states.  Results  for  this  model  show  that  
health  insurance  coverage  is  .6  percentage  points  less  likely,  on  average,  in  
RTW  states  than  for  non-RTW  states  and  is  significant  at  the  0.01  alpha  level  
(Appendix  B).  R2  value,  0.0002,  for  this  model  explains  very  little  variation  in  the  
response  variable  around  the  mean  at  around  0%.  
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Model  II  
The  second  model  adds  dummy  variables  for  year  (2001=0,  etc.)  to  the  
previous  model.  The  inclusion  of  the  year  variable  controls  for  national  trends  in  
health  insurance  coverage  in  both  RTW  and  non-RTW  states.  After  controlling  for  
RTW  status,  results  show  that,  on  average,  health  insurance  coverage  after  2002  
decreases  across  years  in  comparison  to  year  2001  and  are  all  significant  at  the  
0.01  level  (Appendix  C)  for  RTW  states.    Health  insurance  coverage  is  .7  
percentage  points  less  likely,  on  average,  in  RTW  states  than  for  non-RTW  
states  and  is  significant  at  the  0.01  alpha  level.  These  results  support  findings  
found  in  Appendix  A  since  the  parameters  from  2002-2013  show  a  decreasing  or  
less  positive  average  coverage  level  each  year.  Inclusion  of  year  dummy  
variables  results  in  a  slight  increase  of  the  R2  value  of  to  0.0042.      
Model  III  
The  third  model  includes  an  interaction  term  for  RTW  and  year  with  
dummy  variables.  This  model  was  constructed  to  determine  whether  the  
relationship  between  year  on  health  coverage  was  different  for  RTW  states  
versus  non-RTW  states.    That  is,  if  there  is  a  difference  or  divergence  in  the  
decline  across  years  for  insurance  coverage  in  RTW  versus  non-RTW  states.  
The  RTW  effect  for  year  2001  is  the  coefficient  for  RTW  status,  -0.0028,  which  
says  on  average  for  year  2001,  health  insurance  coverage  is  .2  percentage  
points  less  likely,  in  RTW  states  than  for  non-RTW  states.  When  adding  the  
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RTW/Year  interaction  to  the  model,  RTW  status  is  not  statistically  significant.  The  
effect  of  the  interaction  term  for  year  2002  on  coverage  in  a  RTW  state,  is  the  
RTW  coefficient,  (-.002)  *1(RTW=1)  +  (-0.0028)  (RTW/year  2002=1),  meaning  in  
year  2002  coverage  is  -0.48  percentage  points  in  RTW  states  or  about  half  of  a  
percentage  point  less  than  in  non-RTW  states.  In  addition,  the  full  year  effect  
(year  plus  interaction)  is  reported  to  capture  the  effect  across  time  between  the  
two  state  types.    
Results  show  that  the  effect  of  year  on  health  coverage  declines  for  non-
RTW  (which  is  the  year  coefficient)  and  RTW  states  at  a  similar  rate.  This  result  
is  confirmed  by  the  graphic  in  Appendix  A  that  shows  no  difference  in  rate.  The  
full  effect  of  RTW  status  (RTW  plus  RTW/Year  interaction)  and  year  effect  (Year  
plus  RTW/Year  interaction)  is  reported  in  Appendices,  section  D.  The  addition  of  
the  interaction  term  increases  R2  value  to  0.0044,  only  furthering  the  explanation  
of  variation  slightly.    
Model  IV  
The  final  model  includes  firm  characteristics  and  demographic  variables  in  
addition  to  those  in  the  three  models  above.  The  purpose  of  this  model  is  to  
determine  whether  firm  and  demographic  variables  influence  the  effect  of  having  
health  coverage  after  controlling  for  RTW  status,  year,  and  interaction  between  
RTW  policy  and  year.  According  to  the  results,  there  is  an  influence  on  coverage  
across  firm  and  demographic  variables  as  the  probability  of  having  health  
coverage  on  average  in  a  RTW  state  decreases  nearly  1.7  percentage  points,  
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but  this  is  not  statistically  significant.    Each  firm  and  demographic  variable  across  
every  category  returned  a  statistically  significant  result  except  for  the  medical  
industry  variable  which.  For  firm  size  and  education,  the  probability  of  having  
health  insurance  increases  the  bigger  the  firm  and  the  higher  the  education  level.  
This  may  be  because  bigger  firms  tend  to  employ  more  full-time  workers  who  
earn  higher  wages  and  so  are  able  to  substitute  wages  for  health  insurance  
benefits.  Higher  education  is  associated  with  higher  wages  and  so  a  greater  
probability  of  obtaining  health  insurance.  Previous  review  of  literature  confirms  
that  union  members  are  more  likely  to  have  health  insurance  versus  non-union  
workers.  In  this  case,  union  workers,  all  else  constant,  are  on  average,  7  
percentage  points  more  likely  to  be  covered  than  non-union  workers.  When  
compared  with  white  worker’s  blacks,  Asians  and  Others  those  having  health  
coverage  decreased,  but  the  decrease  is  less  among  Asians.  This  may  be  
because  Asian  workers  typically  have  higher  paying  jobs  that  offer  health  
coverage  or  that  they  may  place  more  emphasis  on  obtaining  it.  Lastly,  in  
comparison  to  the  East  North  Central  region  (includes:  Illinois,  Indiana,  Michigan,  
Ohio,  Wisconsin)  those  having  health  insurance  decrease  both  in  regions  
predominantly  RTW  and  regions  non-RTW.  This  is  surprising  as  previous  
research  has  shown  states  located  in  historically  RTW  regions  are  associated  
with  lower  health  insurance  coverage  rate  due  to  lower  wages  in  conjunction  with  
high  medical  costs.  The  full  effect  of  RTW  status  (RTW  plus  RTW/Year  
interaction)  as  well  as  demographic  and  firm  characteristics  is  reported  in  
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Appendices,  section  E.    When  adding  firm  and  demographic  variables,  the  R2  
value  increases  to  0.1602,  explaining  about  16  percent  of  the  variation  in  the  
dependent  variable  around  the  mean.  Model  IV  explains  more  variability  than  the  
other  linear  models  and  difference-in-differences  model  I.    
Model  V  
The  final  model  incorporates  all  variables  from  Model  IV,  but  eliminates  
the  RTW/Year  interaction  term.  The  RTW  effect  is  statistically  significant  and  
becomes  more  negative,  at  about  2  percentage  points,  than  in  previous  models  
upon  dropping  the  interaction.  Results  for  firm  and  demographic  parameters  and  
statistical  significance  do  not  show  much  change  from  Model  IV.  Year  
coefficients  were  decreasing,  showing  a  downward  trend  across  years  for  health  
insurance  coverage  as  revealed  in  the  initial  analysis  in  Appendix  A.  Full  results  
listed  in  Appendix  F.  The  removal  of  the  interaction  term  decreases  the  R2  term  
very  slightly  to  .1600,  down  from  .1602,  but  this  is  not  unexpected  as  the  
interaction  variable  did  not  contribute  to  a  large  increase  in  response  variation  in  
model  III.    
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Table 1.1: OLS Regression: Coefficient Results for RTW Effect
Model  

I  

II  

III  

IV  

V  

Variable    

No  Controls  
-0.0063***  

Year  Controls  
            -0.0067***  

RTW/Year  
-0.003  

Firm/Demographics  
-0.0168223  

Final  
-0.019432***  

(-0.00183)  

(-0.00183)  

(-0.0052734)  

(-0.0343977)  

(-0.0021697)  

0.0213001  

0.001  

-0.0290238  
-0.0260287  
-0.0478185  
-0.0553849  
-0.0616117  
-0.0671714  
-0.0727339  
-0.0986936  
-0.086956  
-0.1021527  
-0.1108748  

-0.0074  
-0.0098  
-0.0255  
-0.0331  
-0.0377  
-0.0391  
-0.0457  
-0.0753  
-0.0599  
-0.0714  
-0.0839  

RTW  Indicator  

Year  2002  
Year  2003  
Year  2004  
Year  2005  
Year  2006  
Year  2007  
Year  2008  
Year  2009  
Year  2010  
Year  2011  
Year  2012  
Year  2013  

Note:  ***  denotes  significance  at  the  0.01  level,  **significance  at  the  0.05  level.  Robust  standard  error  
shown  in  parentheses.

Difference-in-Differences  Models  
For  models  I  and  II,  the  original  industry  variable  is  included  in  lieu  of  the  
industry  categories  used  in  the  linear  models  since  the  measure  of  industry  effect  
across  different  sectors  was  not  a  focus  point  for  these  models.  The  original  
variable  includes  all  industry  coding  regardless  of  CPS  changes,  so  all  185,607  
observations  from  the  individual-level  data  are  used.      
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Model  I  &  II  
The  first  model  includes  demographic  control  variables  to  explain  any  
alternative  differences  between  individuals  that  may  influence  health  care  
coverage  rate  that  is  not  the  effect  of  RTW  laws.  The  next  model  incorporates  
industry  and  occupation  control  variables  to  the  model  above  to  explain  
additional  differences  in  health  care  coverage  among  individuals.    Industry  and  
occupation  coefficients  are  not  reported,  but  their  inclusion  in  the  model  results  in  
a  decrease  in  outcomes  associated  with  RTW  policy  (Table  1.2).    In  both  models,  
after  accounting  for  pre-existing  differences  that  explain  may  the  decision  to  
implement  RTW  policy  among  states,  we  see  that  there  is  an  effect  of  RTW  
policy  on  health  care  coverage  (significant  at  0.01  level),  Appendix  G.  The  R2
values  for  model  I  and  II  were  .08  and  .17,  respectively.  The  addition  of  industry  
and  occupation  variables  to  model  II  increased  the  variation  explained  in  the  
response  variable  to  17%.    
The  DD  models  indicate  that  RTW  policy  increases  health  insurance  
coverage  by  about  7  percentage  points  in  each  of  the  two  models.  An  estimate  of  
average  health  insurance  coverage  in  Appendix  A  shows  that  states  with  RTW  
laws  typically  have  a  lower  incidence  of  coverage  than  those  in  non-RTW  states.  
In  addition,  the  trend  for  both  type  of  states  exhibited  a  downward  trend  across  
each  year.  For  the  states  that  underwent  a  change  in  RTW  laws  during  the  2001-
2013-time  period,  the  results  of  the  DD  models  suggest  that  coverage  increased  
more  among  the  states  that  changed  their  law  than  for  states  that  did  not  even  
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though  initial  analysis  showed  an  overall  decrease  (Appendix  A).  In  other  words,  
the  adoption  of  a  RTW  law  decreased  the  rate  of  decline  in  health  insurance  
coverage.  This  decrease  in  trend  may  have  been  less  among  states  that  adopted  
a  RTW  law  because  the  policy  change  increased  the  affordability  for  businesses  
to  offer  health  insurance  coverage  to  employees  (Appendix  H).  

Model
Variable
Var. X

Table 1.2: Difference-in-Differences
Coefficient Results
I

II

Demographic  
Controls  

Industry  and  
Occupation  

0.0704492***
(0.0016739)

0.0675146***
(0.0030688)

Note:  ***  denotes  significance  at  the  0.01  level,  **significance  at  the  0.05  level

Limitations  
Using  a  linear  probability  for  a  model  with  a  dependent  variable  with  0,1  
response  can  return  predictor  and  predicted  values  that  are  greater  than  one  or  
negative.  Because  the  error  term  can  take  on  only  two  values,  the  variance  
changes  for  all  observations  and  so  is  heteroscedastic  and  consistent  standard  
errors  need  to  be  computed  needed  to  address  this  issue.  In  addition,  as  a  
predictor  value  increases  or  decreases  in  unit  change  there  is  a  consistent  
change  in  probability.  That  is,  the  probability  does  not  reflect  the  change  
expected  or  intuitive  upon  unit  change.    
There  are  two  limitations  to  using  the  difference-in-differences  model  
approach.  The  first  is  the  parallel  trends  assumption  which  assumes  that  the  
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change  in  the  untreated  group  (non-RTW)  is  the  same  as  the  change  the  treated  
group  (RTW)  would  have  experienced  had  it  not  undergone  treatment  (policy  
change).  Or,  that  the  trend  in  both  groups  would  have  continued  to  be  the  same  
had  the  study  group  not  experienced  a  policy  change.  If  this  assumption  is  not  
true  and  each  type  of  state  was  significantly  different  from  one  another  prior  to  
policy  change,  then  the  DD  model  would  yield  biased  results.    
The  common  shocks  assumption  states  that  the  control  group  and  study  
group  will  be  equally  impacted  by  an  unpredictable  event  (not  concerning  RTW  
policy)  before  or  after  policy  implementation.  Under  this  assumption,  the  only  
difference  between  RTW  and  non-RTW  states  would  be  that  one  had  been  
exposed  to  policy  and  the  other  had  not.  It  is  difficult  to  assume  that  no  other  
differences  exist  between  the  two  types  of  states  that  lead  them  to  decide  to  
implement  RTW  policy.    
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CONCLUSION  
The  long-term  relationship  between  right-to-work  legislation  and  employee  
health  benefits  needs  to  undergo  more  extensive  research  to  understand  why  so  
many  full-time  workers  lack  health  insurance.  However,  measuring  the  long-term  
effect  of  RTW  legislation  on  health  coverage  is  difficult  because  it  is  hard  to  
isolate  the  many  confounding  socio-demographic  factors  that  impact  employee  
coverage.    Failure  to  account  for  these  socio-demographic  variables  will  bias  the  
estimate  of  the  impact  RTW  status  has  on  employee  insurance  coverage.    
Knowledge  of  how  state  level  RTW  legislation  impacts  employee  health  coverage  
allows  policy  makers  to  better  understand  the  relationship  between  RTW  status  
and  health  insurance  coverage.    
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Appendix  A  
Average  Health  Insurance  Outcome  by  Year  Between  RTW  and  Non-RTW  States  
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Appendix  B:  Model  I  
  Full  Results  from  OLS  Regression,  No  Controls  

hinsemp

Coefficient Robust S.E.

Significance

RTW

-.00633 .00183

0.001***

Constant

.8097

0.000***

.00127

Sample Size

185,607

R-Squared

0.0002

Adjusted R-Squared

0.0002
Note:  ***  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level,  **  at  0.05
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Appendix  C:  Model  II  
Full  Results  from  OLS  Regression  for  Year  and  RTW  

hinsemp

Coefficient

RTW
Year

-0.00667
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Constant
Sample Size
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

0.00245
-0.00968
-0.01503
-0.02766
-0.03105
-0.0378
-0.03061
-0.03873
-0.06248
-0.05965
-0.06989
-0.07521
0.84034
185,607

Robust
S.E.
0.00183

Significance

0.00375
0.00382
0.00385
0.00438
0.00442
0.00445
0.0044
0.00451
0.0046
0.00464
0.00468
0.00471
0.0028

0.0042
0.0042

Note:  ***  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level,  **  at  0.05  
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0.000***
0.513
0.011**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Appendix  D:  Model  III  

Full  Results  from  OLS  Regression,  RTW/Year  Interactions  
hinsemp

Coefficient

RTW

Robust Std.
Err.

Significance

-0.0029848

0.0052734

0.571

0.0038311
-0.0118858
-0.0201972
-0.0296531
-0.0290847
-0.0377699
-0.0227332
-0.0321638
-0.0504482
-0.0593856
-0.0684036
-0.0668777

0.0052254
0.0053393
0.0054062
0.0061174
0.0060962
0.0061758
0.0060343
0.0062155
0.0063637
0.006449
0.0064899
0.0064867

0.463
0.026**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

1 2002
1 2003
1 2004
1 2005
1 2006
1 2007
1 2008
1 2009
1 2010
1 2011
1 2012
1 2013
Full RTW Effect
(RTW+ RTW/Year)

-0.0028268
0.0044853
0.0104373
0.0041083
-0.0040477
0.0000216
-0.0163896
-0.0135489
-0.0248605
-0.0005122
-0.0030295
-0.0170292
RTW

0.0075014
0.0076385
0.0076962
0.0087666
0.0088431
0.0089248
0.0088178
0.0090297
0.009293
0.0092925
0.0093643
0.0094262
Interaction

0.706
0.557
0.175
0.639
0.647
0.998
0.063
0.133
0.007**
0.956
0.746
0.071
Full Effect

1 2002
1 2003

-0.0029848
-0.0029848

-0.0028268
0.0044853

-0.0058116
0.0015005

Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
RTW/Year
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1 2004
1 2005
1 2006
1 2007
1 2008
1 2009
1 2010
1 2011
1 2012
1 2013

-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848
-0.0029848

0.0104373
0.0041083
-0.0040477
0.0000216
-0.0163896
-0.0135489
-0.0248605
-0.0005122
-0.0030295
-0.0170292

0.0074525
0.0011235
-0.0070325
-0.0029632
-0.0193744
-0.0165337
-0.0278453
-0.003497
-0.0060143
-0.020014

Full Year Effect (Year
+ RTW/Year)

Year

Interaction

Full Effect

1 2002
1 2003
1 2004
1 2005
1 2006
1 2007
1 2008
1 2009
1 2010
1 2011
1 2012
1 2013

0.0038311
-0.0118858
-0.0201972
-0.0296531
-0.0290847
-0.0377699
-0.0227332
-0.0321638
-0.0504482
-0.0593856
-0.0684036
-0.0668777

-0.0028268
0.0044853
0.0104373
0.0041083
-0.0040477
0.0000216
-0.0163896
-0.0135489
-0.0248605
-0.0005122
-0.0030295
-0.0170292

0.0010
-0.0074
-0.0098
-0.0255
-0.0331
-0.0377
-0.0391
-0.0457
-0.0753
-0.0599
-0.0714
-0.0839

0.8385427

0.0036713

0.000***

Constant
Sample Size

185,607

R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

0.0044
0.0042

  Note:  ***  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level,  **  at  0.05
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Appendix  E:  Model  IV  
Full  Results  from  OLS  Regression,  Firm  and  Demographic  Characteristics  

hinsemp
RTW

Coefficient

Std. Err.

Significance

-0.0168223

0.0343977

0.625

2002

0.0012405

0.0354519

0.972

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

-0.0293417
-0.0398854
-0.0527361
-0.0540567
-0.0683907
-0.0550978
-0.0638832
-0.0789442
-0.0836426
-0.0946157
-0.0959012

0.0246649
0.0246728
0.0248073
0.0248062
0.024819
0.0247965
0.0248153
0.0248431
0.0248908
0.0248996
0.0249134

0.234
0.106
0.034**
0.029**
0.006**
0.026**
0.010**
0.001**
0.001**
0.000***
0.000***

1 2002
1 2003
1 2004
1 2005
1 2006
1 2007
1 2008
1 2009
1 2010
1 2011
1 2012
1 2013

0.0200596
0.0003179
0.0138567
0.0049176
-0.0013282
0.006779
-0.0120736
-0.0088507
-0.0197494
-0.0033134
-0.007537
-0.0149736

0.0468473
0.0347606
0.0347732
0.0349761
0.0349968
0.0350097
0.0349925
0.0350172
0.0350754
0.0350809
0.0350944
0.0351072

0.669
0.993
0.69
0.888
0.97
0.846
0.73
0.8
0.573
0.925
0.83
0.67

Age

0.0044579

0.0000879

0.000***

Race
Black
Asian
Other

-0.0783918
-0.0235556
-0.0610471

0.0036322
0.004877
0.0065444

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Year

RTW#year
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Educ
H.S. Diploma

0.1187474

0.0114795

0.000***

Some College

0.1659315

0.0115408

0.000***

Associate,
Academic,

0.1976913

0.0119697

0.000***

Associate,
Vocational

0.1940017

0.0119976

0.000***

Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate

0.2251171
0.2314243
0.2369108

0.0114897
0.0116618
0.0126638

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Professional
School

0.2213146

0.013073

0.000***

Sex(1)

-0.0096408

0.0021282

0.000***

East South
Central

-0.01303

0.0049966

0.009**

Middle Atlantic

-0.0196584

0.0039473

0.000***

Mountain

-0.0196584

0.0042344

0.000***

New England

-0.0691172

0.0038066

0.000***

Pacific

-0.0582686

0.0041046

0.000***

South Atlantic

-0.036545

0.0035856

0.000***

West North
Central

-0.0275976

0.0036744

0.000***

West South
Central

-0.0636549

0.004642

0.000***

Fullpart
Union

0.1542956
0.0662851

0.0034463
0.0023594

0.000***
0.000***

Firm size
10 to 24
10 to 49
25 to 99
50 to 99

0.0943596
0.0972707
0.1726748
0.164957

0.005652
0.007383
0.0048392
0.0088447

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Region
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100 to 499
500 to 999
1000+

0.2125847
0.2249844
0.2317048

0.0043585
0.0050262
0.0039258

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Government

0.0040278

0.0036514

0.27

Service & Retail

-0.0745321

0.0030153

0.000***

Medical
Financial
Education
Agriculture

-0.0065629
0.0334373
-0.0295241
-0.0481726

0.0036658
0.0039084
0.0038016
0.0078004

0.073
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Science &
Technology

0.0187312

0.0048734

0.000***

Energy
Other

0.0331187
-0.1812404

0.0058256
0.015579

0.000***
0.000***

Indnew

Full RTW Effect
(RTW+
RTW/Year)

RTW

Interaction

Full Effect

1 2002
1 2003
1 2004
1 2005
1 2006
1 2007
1 2008

-0.0168223
-0.0168223
-0.0168223
-0.0168223
-0.0168223
-0.0168223
-0.0168223

0.0200596
0.0003179
0.0138567
0.0049176
-0.0013282
0.006779
-0.0120736

0.0032373
-0.0165044
-0.0029656
-0.0119047
-0.0181505
-0.0100433
-0.0288959

1 2009

-0.0168223

-0.0088507

-0.025673

1 2010

-0.0168223

-0.0197494

-0.0365717

1 2011

-0.0168223

-0.0033134

-0.0201357

1 2012
1 2013

-0.0168223
-0.0168223

-0.007537
-0.0149736

-0.0243593
-0.0317959

Full Year Effect
(Year +
RTW/Year)

Year

Interaction

Full Effect

1 2002

0.0012405

0.0200596

0.0213001
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1 2003
1 2004
1 2005
1 2006
1 2007
1 2008
1 2009
1 2010
1 2011
1 2012
1 2013

-0.0293417
-0.0398854
-0.0527361
-0.0540567
-0.0683907
-0.0550978
-0.0638832
-0.0789442
-0.0836426
-0.0946157
-0.0959012

0.0003179
0.0138567
0.0049176
-0.0013282
0.006779
-0.0120736
-0.0088507
-0.0197494
-0.0033134
-0.007537
-0.0149736

-0.0290238
-0.0260287
-0.0478185
-0.0553849
-0.0616117
-0.0671714
-0.0727339
-0.0986936
-0.086956
-0.1021527
-0.1108748

Constant

0.2718199

0.0276398

0.000***

Sample Size

143,695

R-Squared

0.1602

Adjusted RSquared

0.1598

  Note:  ***  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level,  **  at  0.05  
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Appendix  F:  Model  V  
Full  Results  from  OLS  Regression,  Final  Model  

Coefficient
-0.0194707

Robust
Std. Err.
0.0021673

Significance
0.000***

0.01252
-0.0292636
-0.0331262
-0.050423
-0.054807
-0.0652628
-0.060985
-0.0682607
-0.0885857
-0.0853158
-0.0983289
-0.1032044

0.0231072
0.0178827
0.0178884
0.0179862
0.0179936
0.0179991
0.0179837
0.0179963
0.0180277
0.0180594
0.018074
0.0180851

0.588
0.102
0.064
0.005**
0.002**
0.000***
0.001**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

0.0044596

0.0000879

0.000***

Black
Asian
Other

-0.0783018
-0.0235787
-0.0613015

0.003632
0.0048777
0.0065447

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Educ
H.S. Diploma
Some College
Associate, Academic,
Associate, Vocational
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
Professional School

0.1185246
0.1657101
0.197499
0.1938054
0.2247905
0.2311239
0.2364042
0.2210504

0.0114806
0.011542
0.011971
0.0119991
0.0114907
0.0116627
0.0126645
0.0130765

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Sex

-0.0096215

0.0021284

0.000***

Region
East South Central
Middle Atlantic

-0.0133035
-0.0199598

0.004997
0.0039457

0.008**
0.000***

hinsemp
RTW
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Age
Race
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Mountain
New England
Pacific
South Atlantic
West North Central
West South Central

-0.0693255
-0.0182776
-0.058126
-0.0365858
-0.028015
-0.0640912

0.0042324
0.0038061
0.0041038
0.003585
0.0036727
0.0046393

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Fullpart
Union

0.1542874
0.0662473

0.0034467
0.002359

0.000***
0.000***

Firm size
10 to 24
10 to 49
25 to 99
50 to 99
100 to 499
500 to 999
1000+

0.0945714
0.097286
0.172643
0.1648024
0.2126456
0.2251668
0.2317587

0.0056521
0.007382
0.0048397
0.0088456
0.0043588
0.005026
0.0039259

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Indnew
Government
Service & Retail
Medical
Financial
Education
Agriculture
Science & Technology
Energy
Other

0.0039884
-0.0745655
-0.0065299
0.0333966
-0.0294192
-0.0483314
0.0187
0.0329777
-0.1812468

0.0036513
0.003015
0.0036657
0.0039083
0.0038019
0.0078
0.0048731
0.0058238
0.0155852

0.275
0.000***
0.075
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Constant
Sample Size
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

0.273454
147,495
0.1600
0.1597

0.0219225

0.000***

Note:  ***  is  significant  at  the  0.01  level,  **  at  0.05  

41

Appendix  G:  
Difference-in-Differences  Model  I  

hinsemp
X
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Coef. Std. Err.
.0704492 .0016739

Significance
0.000***

-.0608543 .0021002
-.0941065 .001183
-.0592497 .0009803
.0007374 .0021254
.0277077 .0010376
.0628822 .0013858
.0825067 .0013744
-.0125248 .0027122
-.0756491 .0008135
.0480418 .0020829
.141182 .0091306
.0097503 .0002927
-.0093921 .0007196
.0068967 .0012711
-.0075188 .0017054
.0402502 .000898
-.0042437 .0013839
.0272643 .0014988
.035365 .0005232
.0823403 .0026124
-.0245088 .0011565
.0710003 .0009597
-.0233354 .0013871
.0578546 .0022139
.0639571 .0008639
-.1407606 .0014362
-.0357112 .0014478
.0508382 .0013594
.072834 .0008679
.0558207 .0015523
-.0619573 .0015691
-.0395278 .0007633
-.0330701 .0004953
.0240641 .0007264
.0167377 .001004
.019864 .0019431
.0162687 .0008144
.0892435 .0007676
-.0056636 .0012664
-.0274287 .0005653
-.0658578 .0014533
-.03973 .0008696
-.0646366 .0008405
.0758193 .0004888

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.730
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.003***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
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Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

-.0429203 .0016666
.0309994 .0017329
.0384841 .0011528
.0505383 .0007209
.0127071 .0015275
(omitted)

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

-.0029018 .0036444
-.0169759 .0050718
-.0249173 .0051214
-.0418681 .0056834
-.0437901 .0060688
-.0517659 .0063904
-.0495539 .0068134
-.059603 .0063565
-.0845094 .0056342
-.0837655 .0075893
-.0958 .0057566
-.1036599 .0059854

0.430
0.002***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Black
Asian
Other

-.0526631 .0062057
-.0421988 .0111167
-.0763344 .01509

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Age
Sex (female)

.0055052 .0001272
.0145734 .0026127

0.000***
0.000***

Education
H.S. Diploma
Some College
Associate, Academic,
Associate, Vocational
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
Professional School

.1375143
.1848792
.2423001
.2292367
.2796144
.306119
.3039634
.2833768

.0158766
.01805
.0195595
.0192399
.0181985
.0211827
.0193821
.0185666

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Constant
Sample Size
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

.3795964 .0197379
185,607
0.0767
0.0762

0.000***

Year

Race
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Appendix  H:
Difference-in-Differences  Model  II  

hinsemp
X
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

Coef. Std. Err.
.0675146 .0030688

Significance
0.000***

-.0564804 .0028286
-.0843862 .0017346
-.0556031 .0015954
.0127575 .002761
.0326134 .0020795
.0624707 .0022653
.0790059 .0027331
-.0078984 .0037658
-.0565268 .0013362
.0447493 .0031078
.1720671 .0082325
.0189123 .0021701
-.001291 .0015091
.0065576 .0016922
-.0028177 .0024475
.0438538 .0019167
-.0052351 .0016932
.0222952 .0026318
.0420795 .0023368
.0795453 .0029068
-.0098375 .0020666
.0712086 .0024571
-.0142915 .0018459
.0543568 .0031819
.0653141 .0023044
-.1125081 .0028141
-.0304724 .0020754
.0781106 .0054021
.0704567 .0021088
.062869 .0025659
-.05359 .0026819
-.0220029 .0011888
-.0236779 .0012611
.0323057 .0021886
.0213775 .0013998
.020309 .002551
.0293186 .0022179
.0912425 .0024661
.0022299 .00168
-.0211154 .0016065
-.0565055 .0024324
-.0382806 .001355

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.041**
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.396
0.000***
0.255
0.000***
0.003***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.19
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
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Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

-.0649433 .0014707
.0700648 .0020206
-.0296656 .0019255
.0323282 .0025738
.045627 .0021468
.0475338 .0018572
.0122493 .002175
(omitted)

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

-.0005464 .0035048
.0285225 .0535496
.0210857 .054338
.0096844 .0527796
.0081832 .0534465
.0014183 .0535319
.003774 .0525469
-.004538 .0527897
-.0260501 .0527688
-.0269858 .0520965
-.0388268 .05461
-.0454632 .0526138

0.877
0.597
0.700
0.855
0.879
0.979
0.943
0.932
0.624
0.607
0.480
0.392

Black
Asian
Other

-.0431035 .0059949
-.0266541 .0089652
-.0690693 .0135322

0.000***
0.005***
0.000***

.0037771 .0001105
.000855 .0025683

0.000***
0.741

.0812739
.101319
.1187817
.119197
.1365692
.1481822
.1624505
.1334216

.014141
.0150053
.0162228
.0162551
.0147907
.0166139
.0155163
.0160975

0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

.2993984 .0677112
185,607
0.1709
0.1637

0.000***

Year

Race

Age
Sex (female)
Education
H.S. Diploma
Some College
Associate, Academic,
Associate, Vocational
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
Professional School

Industry included
Constant
Sample Size
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
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Appendix I:
Region Categories

●

(0) East North Central Division: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin

●

(1) East South Central Division: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee

●

(2) Middle Atlantic Division: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania

●

(3) Mountain Division: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming
(4) New England Division: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Vermont
(5) Pacific Division: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington

●
●
●
●
●

(6) South Atlantic Division: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia
(7) West North Central Division: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota
(8) West South Central Division: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas

46

Appendix  J:  
States  with  RTW  Laws  2012–2013  

Arizona  (Constitution,  State  Constitution  

Iowa  (adopted  1947)  

approved  1946)  (adopted  1944)  

Nevada  (adopted  1951)  

Florida  (Constitution,  1944,  revised  1968,  

Alabama  (adopted  1953,  Constitution  2016)  

Article  1,  Section  6)  

Mississippi  (Constitution,  adopted  1954)  

South  Dakota  (adopted  1946)  

South  Carolina  (adopted  1954)  

Nebraska  (Constitution  and  statute,  adopted  

Utah  (adopted  1955)  

1946)  

Kansas  (Constitution,  1958,  Article  15,  

Virginia  (adopted  1947)  

Section  12)  

Arkansas  (Constitution,  1947,  Amendment  

Wyoming  (adopted  1963)  

34)  

Louisiana  (adopted  1976)  

Tennessee  (adopted  1947)  

Idaho  (adopted  1985)  

Texas  (adopted  1947)  

Oklahoma  (Constitution,  adopted  2001)  

North  Carolina  (adopted  1947)  

Indiana  (State  law,  2012)  

North  Dakota  (adopted  1947)  

Michigan  (State  law,  201

Georgia  (adopted  1947)  
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